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War, Empire, and Republic in Revolutionary
Europe
A Review-Interview with R. Whatmore
Manuela Albertone
Riard Whatmore’s last book provides an interdisciplinary approa in in-
tellectual history that centers around some political and economical issues
debated in the last decades of the eighteenth-century. e story of how the
Genevan représentants tried to preserve the independence of their city in the
face of the power of France and Britain is investigated as a case study to set
out the dialectic between small and large states in the last years of the Old
regime and during the revolutionary period, as well as the role of free trade
in indicating the path to reorganise international relationships. Some of the
main arguments and conclusions of the book are discussed here with the au-
thor: a modern republicanism and its economic foundations, tension between
democracy and republicanism, a new stress on the political implications of
Physiocracy, an innovative idea of empire investigated from the perspective
of continental Europe. e author, Director of the Sussex Centre for Intel-
lectual History, also discusses with us the interdisciplinary aracteristics of
the current main trends of intellectual history in Britain.
0 RWhatmore’s last book, Against War and Empire. Geneva,Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century (NewHaven-London,Yale University Press, ) provides an intellectual history of Genevafrom the uprising of  to the end of the French revolution, which is
connected with some central issues of a current historiographic debate:
the idea and nature of eighteenth-century empire, republicanism, and the
links between politics and economics, democracy and representation.
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas (), , p. :–:. Non peer-reviewed.
His first work, Republicanism and the Fren Revolution: An Intellectual
History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy¹, drew aention to an
eighteenth-century French republicanism derived from economics. e
book was characterised by an interdisciplinary approach to intellectual
history and it gave us a new reading of the French economist, usually
simply considered as the French adaptor of Smith’s free trade ideas. Con-
sistent with this methodology, in Against War and Empire he offers us
now an even more complex interaction between politics, religion and
economics. Against War and Empire is the story of how some Genevan
inhabitants—the représentants, who opposed the magistrats’ aristocracy
in the oligarchic republic—tried to maintain their city’s independence in
face of the power of France and Britain, developing an original perspec-
tive on politics and political economy, as they were aware that for small
states Europe had to become peaceful, being unable to stand against the
military power of large commercial monarchies. is entailed a recon-
sideration of the notion of empire and of international relations among
states and with regard to commerce. is perspective throws a new light
on the Genevan contribution to the links between politics and economics
in the last decades of the Old Regime and on the presence of Genevan
actors in the French revolution far beyond Bénétruy’s still useful but now
outdated Atelier de Mirabeau².
e book is divided into four parts divided in turn into detailed chap-
ters. Part one puts forward the general plan of the work and highlights
Calvin’s legacy at Geneva, as political and moral transformation con-
stantly implied reform to its fullest extent, which remained a strong belief
within the représentants’ circles and remained constant in the author’s
view. e religious frame of political and economic discussions in 
at Geneva among lawyers, merchants and pastors and the failure of the
Genevan uprising aer an invasion by foreign troops was essential in
shaping the conviction that large monarchies had to be reformed polit-
¹ R. Whatmore, Republicanism and the Fren Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-
Baptiste Say’s Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
² J. Bénétruy, L’atelier de Mirabeau: quatre proscrits genevois dans la tourmente révolution-
naire (Genève: A. Jullien, ).
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ically and economically if small states were to survive. Lord Shelburne,
who was the reference of one of the most influential political circles of the
laer half of the eighteenth-century, described an era of Protestantism in
trade in the plan to restore peace between Britain and France, going be-
yond the Seven Years War and mercantilism, and in his argument was
that free trade was beer suited to Protestant states and that the progress
of commerce and the progress of religion were intertwined. e book
highlights a political international Calvinism that turns out to be a new
and different version of Lüthy’s international protestant banking circles¹.
Geneva was at the core of these links: Calvinism, republicanism and lib-
erty are presented as thoroughly interconnected. Proceeding from these
principles, the Genevan représentants went on to elaborate the idea that a
more popular government was the sole means to preserve independence
and Protestantism.
e focus of part two, “e crisis of the Republic, -”, is repre-
sented by the second chapter, “Rousseau and Geneva”, where the author
sets out a stimulating reading of Rousseau as a critic of the corporative el-
ements of the republic of Geneva. Facing the political conflict in Geneva,
the heterodox Rousseau emerges as a moderate, fearing deadly political
consequences of the représentants’ opposition to the magistrates. e au-
thor of the Contrat social is depicted as radical in theory and moderate
in policy, the enemy of the disputes on the ancient Genevan constitution
as well as of democratic republicanism, the supporter of the stability of
law and of a political authority constrained by law, even though we can-
not forget that Rousseau did not cope with the issue of representation.
Rousseau did not work at reforming Geneva in the traditional context,
but at a new European model, and then disagreed with the représentants
as their democratic government threatened to destroy the distinction be-
tween sovereignty and government. Rousseau’s need to separate theolog-
ical and political elements was far from the view of the democratic circles
and his separation of religion from liberty was inconsistent with Genevan
political culture. rough very carefully analysis and utilizing a variety
¹ H. Lüthy, La banque protestante en France: de la révocation de l’édit de Nantes à la Révolution
(Paris: SEVPEN, ).
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of sources, which explain why Rousseau was not perceived by many of
his contemporaries as a republican reformer, this wide-ranging chapter
sheds new light on Rousseau’s selective memory.
Part three, “e crisis of the Empires, -”, represents the core
of the book, a stimulating interdisciplinary reading giving original per-
spectives on the history of empires, and a new contribution to the idea of
a modern republicanism. Richard Whatmore has been working for many
years on the dialectic between small states and large states as a key to re-
consider the eighteenth-century international scene, proceeding from the
links between politics and economics. Moving from different points of ref-
erence, the interdisciplinary intellectual history of the Sussex School, par-
ticularly Donald Winch’s aention to the emergence in the eighteenth-
century of political economy as a modern political language¹, and Istvan
Hont’s highlighting political elements in eighteenth-century theories of
international economic rivalry², the author outlines a new path to over-
come “jealousy of trade”, which is traced through a Genevan lens.
In RichardWhatmore’s analysis the original views of the exiled représen-
tants aer the uprising of  consisted in convincing the commercial
monarchies to abandon empire as traditionally conceived in the frame-
work of the mercantile system. is strategy was developed from 
to the outbreak of the French Revolution and implied the taking of dif-
ferent steps: supporting commerce alliance between Britain and France,
persuading Britain to become the defender of popular republics by dis-
mantling its mercantile policies, and reforming French government. Only
if Britain and France were in peace, free trade might be introduced and
mitigate the drawbacks of empire and the mercantile system.
e culmination of this campaign was the Anglo-French Commercial
Treaty of  implying the idea that commercial empires were compati-
ble with small state independence, that perpetual peace in Europe might
be realized and that the survival of small states was vital for continental
¹ D. Winch, Adam Smith’s politics: an essay in historiographic revision (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, ); D.Winch, Ries and poverty: an intellectual history of political
economy in Britain, - (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
² I. Hont, Jealousy of trade: international competition and the nation-state in historical per-
spective (Cambridge (Mass.): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, ).
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commerce. e Genevan exiles set out to influence the economic policies
of both countries. In  De Lolme’s Constitution d’Angleterre wanted
free states to model themselves on Britain, but he envisaged a Britain
limited in the size of its empire. For Du Roveray, D’Ivernois and Clavière
it was clear in  and aer that economic prosperity was tied to lib-
erty and that France might be persuaded to act as a cosmopolitan empire.
Richard’s Whatmore’s innovative interpretation sets out the views of the
radical Genevans and their cosmopolitan aspirations in working out pos-
sible new relations between Britain and France. Against the eighteenth-
century tradition of concealed Anglo-French conflict, and within a pas-
sionate network linking a variety of intellectual and politicalmilieus, from
the Physiocrats and Turgot to lord Shelburne’s circle and the “atelier” of
Mirabeau, the Genevans exiles played the role of important actors. e
science of political economy represents the shared culture of all these
different milieus and commerce is conceived as the political means to re-
shape the international order by the establishment of perpetual peace on
the basis of a French and British alliance.
e outbreak of the French Revolution marked a split between the ex-
iles, which is followed through the progressive detachment of Clavière
from his compatriots and his engagement as a protagonist in revolution-
ary policy. It corresponds to the strengthening of Britain as defender of
small states in the midst of growing French dominion.
e Epilogue to the fourth part focusses on Etienne Dumont’s align-
ment with Bentham’s position on politics and his warning against democ-
racy as something that had broughtwith it all of the excesses of the French
Revolution. Dumont became an enemy of French republicanism. Follow-
ing Bentham he overcame the distinction between small and large states
and his moderate vision became dominated by a reformed version of the
British model.
To beer understand the methodology and the relevance of the book,
we discuss some of the main arguments and conclusions with the author:
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1 Y were trained and you tea at the University of Sussex, one ofthe most important centres for resear in intellectual history. Youare the Director of the Sussex Centre for Intellectual History and the editorof “History of European Ideas”. What are the aracteristics of the Sussex
interdisciplinary approa in intellectual history? And at what degree your
resear is marked by this or by other intellectual experiences?
John Burrow, my former colleague at Sussex, defined intellectual his-
tory as eavesdropping on the conversations of the past. What I’ve tried to
do inAgainstWar and Empire is to eavesdrop upon a radical Genevan con-
versation over several decades and to reconstruct it for modern readers.
Reconstruction is difficult because many of our assumptions about the
political and economic world have altered since the eighteenth century.
Others might appear to be related but are distinctive once the eighteenth-
century context is recalled. I have been very fortunate in learning my
trade from some of the great intellectual historians both in Cambridge
and at Sussex. As you’ve recognised in this review DonaldWinch and Ist-
van Hont played major roles in shaping my approach, and the same can
be said about John Pocock, whose deeply contextual perspective upon
the past serves as a model. I’ve been very fortunate too in having con-
versations about Geneva and its links with European intellectual life and
politics with leading intellectual historians in Italy, France, Switzerland
and North America and accordingly I owe a great many authors a debt of
gratitude. What I think distinguishes the Sussex approach is an eclecti-
cism about method combined with a refusal to acknowledge disciplinary
boundaries. is means that those associated with Sussex differ from the
Cambridge School associated withentin Skinner, for example, because
the history of liberty from the Sussex perspective is associated with re-
ligion, political economy and international relations; indeed, the point is
that arguments about politics in the eighteenth century had to encom-
pass all of these categories if they were to convince anyone. e insight
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intellectual history gives is to take the arguments of past actors seriously.
eir vision, utopian and complicated as it may have been, made sense
at the time. Too many historians, on the assumption that we have access
to more documents about the past, presume to know more than histori-
cal actors did and sometimes categorise them by reference to ahistorical,
simplistic or anachronistic categories. An example is Robert Darnton’s fa-
mous description of Jacques-Pierre Brissot as a ‘guer-Rousseau’¹. What
being a guer-Rousseau entailed takes some explaining and what Darn-
ton wrote was not precise or detailed enough in my view. I always try to
commence with the language used by the historical actors and work out
the extent to which it can be mapped onto or differs from our own.
2 H can you define the tensions between democracy, republicanismand their economic foundations whi mark your book?is is a very good question and a difficult one to answer. e prob-lem of course, following the last point above, is that the meaning of the
terms republicanism and democracy have changed so much since the
eighteenth century; we still make mistakes in presuming too many con-
tinuities. I used to think—in Republicanism and the Fren Revolution for
example—that you could meaningfully talk about democracy in the s
and make connections between what had happened before, especially
in the small states, and what happened in the revolutionary decade. Al-
though it was clear in the case of Clavière that the democratic ideas he ad-
vocated in France were derived in part from his experience as a représen-
tant, most of these failed and that was the central lesson for contempo-
raries. Democracy was not ‘made’ (as Livesey would have it) in the s:
¹ R. Darnton,e literary underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard Uni-
versity Press, ).
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rather, it failed and confirmed long-established antagonisms. e other
point to make is that democracy before the revolution in France really
was about the experience of small states. Francis D’Ivernois called him-
self a democrat at Geneva and saw the cause of the représentants as a
democratic one. But at the very outset of the Revolution in France he
defended the view that democracy might make sense in lile states but
made no sense at all in a large state. Equality simply could not be made
sense of in such conditions and would always be a mask for injustice.
With other Genevans, including Du Roveray and Dumont, he defended
this view for the rest of his life. Being a republican too did not mean that
you supported revolutionary France—for the most part exactly the op-
posite happened because those who called themselves republicans before
the Revolution sawwhat was happening in France as anti-republican, and
saw this view confirmed when all of the existing republics collapsed be-
fore French arms. e point is that large-state republicanism has to be
distinguished from small state republicanism. French revolutionary re-
publicanism was both new and distinctive in consequence (and did not
have much in common with that of the Federalists in North America).
e point about the economic foundations of political doctrines is I think
the key one. In order to convince in politics you had to show that the
economy would be improved/problems resolved by the politics being ad-
vocated. Otherwise an argument would not convince. So political ideals
such as republicanism were evaluated in accordance with their conse-
quences for the economy—and as the economy was tied to international
relations evaluated in this way too. Religion equally remained important
because of the widespread belief that another counter-reformation would
follow the advance of French arms.is is not what happened, or perhaps
it did in the sense that the counter-reformation had become anti-clerical
with the French Revolution. What I am saying is that we need to look at
the relationship between democracy and republicanism in tandem with
the visions of economic and international transformation that accompa-
nied them and which more oen than not gave substance to them.
 :  Manuela Albertone
3 Y highlight in the Genevan exiles’ thought the role of commercein indicating the path to reorganise international relationships be-tween small and large states and their political structure. I guess we mayintend commerce as the equivalent of economic activity, but we can’t over-
look that the tension between commerce and agriculture in the eighteenth-
century agrarian Europe was at the heart of the first scientific economic the-
ory. How was the relationship between commerce and agriculture conceived
in your resear?
So few of the small states that the Genevans were obsessed by were
agricultural that it might be supposed that they were not interested in
agriculture and its future, but this is not actually the case (although I
did not really discuss the issue in my book). e Genevan représentants
were very proud of the regulation of the grain trade at Geneva, and felt
in general that trade in necessities had to be controlled for the sake of
the poor and for security. ey also tended to be opposed to large farms
on the physiocratic model. Equally, there were echoes of the idealization
of rural life that Rousseau and others considered the foundation for re-
publican virtue. As opponents of luxury, commerce in necessities was
preferred and equated with agricultural life. But in the modern world the
Genevan radicals did not believe that states could turn their backs upon
advanced forms of commerce, and especially France and Britain. In the
work of Brissot and Clavière of course, in the s a division of labour
was envisaged with North America that would allow France to develop
commercially while primary products from America were exchanged for
luxurious French goods.Whatwas required, rather than accepting the pri-
mary of agricultural wealth, was to moderate luxury and the selfishness
that accompanied commercial development. e Genevans drew on their
knowledge of the sumptuary laws regulating Genevan mores in their vi-
sion of a moralized commercial society. Moderate wealth was the ideal to
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be aspired to by everyone, and one that they shared with the members
of the Shelburne circle, that of Benjamin Franklin, and a host of fellow
advocates of an alternative future for the globe.
4 Y stress physiocracy’s role in advancing free trade and peace. Youalso write: “perspectives on France at Geneva were influenced by therise of physiocracy” (p. ). In recent decades important new readings ofphysiocracy have been jointly offered by historians and economists, from
Philippe Steiner ¹ and Catherine Larrère ², to Gino Longhitano ³, Loïc Charles,
Christine éré ⁴ and Miael Sonenser ⁵. ey put a new stress on the po-
litical meaning of physiocratic discourse and some of them have emphasised
the progressive implications of physiocratic political economy. You provide
a further contribution with a dynamic and cosmopolitan reading of phys-
iocracy, whi until now has not aracted a great deal of investigation. is
interpretation differs from your previous analyses, in whi you perceived
physiocracy as a theodicy, as suggested by Miael Sonenser. How can you
explain your new reading?
When I worked on Say I was aware of the critique of physiocracy that
he developed from his association with Clavière and that was common-
place among Genevan représentants (incidentally, I am more convinced
than ever that Say owed more to Clavière than to anyone else in his view
of the world, and especially the belief that Britain was going to collapse
and that a reformed France could be relied upon to moralize commerce
across Europe). I was also aware that physiocratic perspectives upon Eu-
ropean politics changed with the second and third generations, those of
¹ Ph. Steiner, La science nouvelle de l’économie politique (Paris: Presse universitaires de
France, ).
² C. Larrère, L’invention de l’économie au XVIIIe siècle: du droit naturel à la physiocratie
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, ).
³ V. Riqueti de Mirabeau, F. esnay, Traité de la monarie, -. Texte établi par
Gino Longhitano (Paris: l’Harmaan, ).
⁴ L. Charles, C. éré, “e Writing Workshop of François esnay and the Making of
Physiocracy”, History of Political Economy , n.  (), -.
⁵ M. Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the
Fren Revolution (Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, ).
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Turgot andMorellet and of Dupont de Nemours and Condorcet. More par-
ticularly, things changed because of the end of the North American war
and the expectation that Britain was about to change its role in the in-
ternational arena (because it had declined and was economically weaker
than hitherto). In such circumstances, andwith an expectation that France
was on the brink of becoming the greatest economic power in Europe,
physiocratic aitudes to small states changed. A lot more work needs to
be done with regard to the views of esnay, Mirabeau and others (Béla
Kapossy’s project of puing online Mirabeau’s correspondence will help
all of us). But the general view was that small states, like small farms,
made lile sense. Reading Dupont de Nemours’ early view of European
politics exactly this can be discerned. But more radical opponents of em-
pire, such as Turgot and later Condorcet, began to portray themselves as
defenders of a Europe characterised by small states, and supportive of a
France dedicated to ridding the world of the kinds of economic corruption
associated with British mercantilism. In such conditions it was necessary
to work out what the impact of physiocratic reforms would be upon the
political map of Europe. e physiocrats recognised this. All that I have
done to date really is to recognise that the future of small states was an
issue for them.
5 T idea of empire in your book is very innovative and amounts toan original contribution to the current historiographic debate. Fac-ing investigations of empires as the core of the Atlantic history, primarily theAtlantic-based British Empire, but even Spanish, Fren or the Portuguese
Empire too, you reconsider contributions made in this field from the per-
spective of continental Europe. Even from the intellectual history perspec-
tive, we can oppose the unity of eighteen-century Anglo-American political
thought to classical republicanism and in turn to the variety of approaes
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of your resear emphasising different political traditions in continental Eu-
rope. Moreover, you reconsider Britain as an interacting part of European
political culture. A clear stimulus coming from Istvan Hont’s Jealousy of
Trade is present in your book, marked however by a further aention to
the democratic dimension of disputes on competition among states. Among
the historians of empires you are also close to David Armitage’s optimistic
assessment that trade depends on liberty and that Britain might combine
liberty and empire¹ (even though a distinctive idea of British empire, shaped
by the Genevan exiles, emerges from your book). In this perspective your
approa risks over-emphasising the role of Britain. In focussing upon the
international competition between Britain and France, you sometimes over-
look the role of the United States. You claim that the American Revolution
provided new scenarios for radical circles, and highlight the significance of
Brissot’s and Clavière’s De La France et des Etats-Unis to reconsider rela-
tions between France and America—but the new state and its new political
presence do not emerge as a protagonist. In the frame of small states and
large states as a key to investigate the eighteenth-century international re-
lations, a new republic and a large state, su as the United States quily
became, represented a further and different element to be considered.omas
Jefferson and the Republicans rejected both the British economic and politi-
cal model and they looked at France, its economic culture and its revolution
as a turning point. At the outbreak of the American Revolution the British
colonists set out to legitimate their international image as ampions of free
trade against the Britishmercantile policy.eanged aitude of the Unites
Provinces in reconsidering its international alliances gives evidence of this
movement.
If there has been a flaw in recent work on empire it stems from the fail-
ure to recognise that aspirations to empire encompassed the mainland of
Europe. Debates about empire were as much about the future of Europe
as about anything other part of the world. Given its economic strength,
political stability, and military capabilities, perhaps it is surprising that
Britain did not play a greater role in contemporary European debate. My
¹ D. Armitage,e ideological origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, ).
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argument is that this really did not happen until the French Revolution be-
cause somany people, including enlightenment luminaries across Britain,
were convinced that Britain could not maintain itself politically or eco-
nomically. e French Revolution forced the British to become involved
in the fate of the small states or leave Europe to revolutionary France. As
is so oen the case, perceptions of necessity dictated.
I think that the point about the lack of analysis of the North American
case is a valid criticism. I tend to play down the new republic in European
politics, in part because it was unique in its circumstances, and in part
because it had such an unstable and turbulent birth. A further point is
that in looking to France Jefferson backed a failing state.omas Paine did
likewise, and all of his predictions about the sister republics changing the
world came to nothing. e transition mechanism Paine envisaged from
the existing state of corruption to the new world of moderate wealth and
perpetual peace was ceaseless war on Britain. e British monarchy and
aristocracy had to be destroyed if reform was to be realised. I am more
interested in John Adams’ argument that the British example amounted
to a model for all republics, small and large. is was a claim he shared
with De Lolme and others. Interestingly, such men looked to the history
of Scotland to find proof that small states could thrive within the British
Empire, and that the mercantile system did not do what its critics claimed
it did: destroy the culture, laws, religion and politics of small states. In
short, at the end of the eighteenth century there was a turn to Scoish
history, law, religion and politics to provide evidence that Britain did not
behave like an empire in relation to the constituent parts of the composite
state: it did not homogenise, destroy, or dominate local cultures. is was
crucial to those who wanted to defend Britain as a model for other states
and to overcome the French-led critique that Britain was the worst empire
in history because of its lust for wealth and economic dominion.
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6 S your book on Jean-Batiste Say you have been working at theidea of a modern republicanism, fuelled by the science of politicaleconomy. Your first book alongside with James Livesey’s Making Democ-racy in the French Revolution ¹ aests that a “new republicanism”, centred
firmly on the link between political economy and republic, particularly in re-
lation to Fren economic culture and heedful of democratic participation is
now an accepted bran of resear. You put forward now another important
contribution, strengthening an eighteenth-century idea of republic far from
classical republicanism, as elaborated from John Poco’s e Machiavel-
lian Moment onwards ². You highlight how that Geneva was nourished by a
republican tradition distant from the classical model. Etienne Dumont was
aware that ancient republics did not fit commercial societies. You emphasise
that even the aitude of the exiles in , who were determined not to sacri-
fice themselves, gave the illustration of the gulf between ancient republican
heroism and modern manners. e break among the exiles at the outbreak of
the Fren Revolution and the Epilogue of your book, dominated by Dumont
aligning with Bentham’s position, seems to indicate that some Genevan pro-
tagonists of this cosmopolitan age didn’t resolve the tension between the Old
Regime republican tradition and the modern democratic republics stemmed
from the American and Fren Revolutions. e American colonists first re-
jected the existing order rooted in history and tradition, political and eco-
nomic disputes in Geneva undermined, as you admirably describe, this tra-
ditional order, and they contributed to the collapse of Old Regime, whi
eventually occurred in France, where and when reforms were revealed to be
insufficient. You mark the Genevans contribution to the Fren Revolution,
but at the end of your book, aer Clavière’s death, they appeared (embodied
by Dumont’s rejecting France and embracing Britain) as unable to under-
stand the new values of rights and popular sovereignty elaborated trough
the revolutionary experience. e identity of Europe stemmed from all this
mix.
¹ J. Livesey, Making democracy in the Fren Revolution (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard Uni-
versity Press, ).
² J. Pocock, e Maiavellian Moment. Florentine Political ought and the Atlantic Repub-
lican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ).
 :  Manuela Albertone
ese are all interesting comments and I’m grateful for them. I’ve said
above that I’ve changed my mind about revolutionary France and the
democracy associated with the First French Republic. I now think that
the key for contemporaries was the failure of the republic, but at the same
time everyone realised you could not go backwards and restore the world
of . Trends that had been evident throughout the eighteenth century
were reaffirmed at the end of the s, that all of the republican ide-
ologies that had helped to shape and create Europe’s small states were no
longer working. Small states and republics could not rely upon diplomacy,
the balance of power, economic specialisation or republican manliness to
defend themselves. Instead they had to choose which great power to sup-
port, and hope that the result was continued independence. e modern
world was a world of large states and large markets, providing revenues
for vast armies and expensive military technology. Britain represented
one solution to the problem, especially in the form of its relationship with
Scotland and later with Ireland. But another solution was republican con-
federation, the idea that had failed in the eighteenth century in the case
of the Swiss and the Dutch, but that would not die and that re-emerged
aer the Napoleonic Wars. What I’m arguing is that there is a real break
with the past in terms of political ideas during the French Revolution.
e world of David Hume and Adam Smith, of Rousseau and of Mon-
tesquieu, was swept away. e new world looked ugly to Jean-Baptiste
Say, because it was dominated by a Britain that ought to have collapsed.
To John Adams, James Mackintosh and Sismondi, among a host of others,
it was a world in which new forms of empire, evinced by Anglo-Scoish
relations, might be sustainable. Accordingly I don’t think that Dumont’s
perspective, outlined only in sketchy terms at the end of the book, is the
end of the story. Rather we have a Europe in which Bentham, against the
advice of Dumont, demands the creation of democratic republics (though
which are different from the republican ideas of Jefferson or Paine), in
which Britain is expected to become a new type of empire (sustaining the
independence of lots of states in the hope of freely trading with them),
and in which states are larger but hopes of republican confederation are
renewed. e point I would make, which goes against a lot of existing lit-
erature, is that it was Britain that did the most to make this new Europe,
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aer the Napoleonic Wars, and that less was owed to the democratic and
rights-based ideas of revolutionary France.
Geneva in the late XVIII century (J.-F. Albanis Beaumont, Travels from
France to Italy through the Lepontine Alps, , Vol. I, p. , pl. XIII.
VIATICALPES, http://purl.org/viatimages/fr/image/250).
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